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5 Questions à Ghislain de Castelbajac sur le retrait des Etats-Unis de l'accord nucléaire Iranien

Since the beginning of the&nbsp;saudi-led&nbsp;military operations in Yemen on 26th March 2015,&nbsp;the Republic of Yemen is facing the worst humanitarian, political, and security crisis in its modern history.&nbsp;The armed conflict has entered a phase of deeper fragmentation, which risks plunging the country into an interminable war, where warlords, terrorist organisations, and criminal networks find safe-havens.

On the &laquo;&nbsp;National level&nbsp;&raquo; Frontline between the Houthi rebels and their allies in the North, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate (UEA) backed forces in the south, on the other hand, remained mostly static&nbsp;and the dynamics of current armed conflict coincides with the old demarcation line between the two pre 1990s separate entities, a) Northern Yemen and b) Southern Yemen.&nbsp;On the regional level,&nbsp;New sub-conflicts and warfare dynamics have emerged, especially in the South. The current fragmentation of the conflict is a clear sign of the erosion of the State Unity.

The root causes of the conflict in Yemen remains linked to the failure of the reunification of the country in 1990, and that the Arab Spring&nbsp;(2011)&nbsp;merely surfaced underlying problems and grievances which had existed for over a decade.&nbsp;&nbsp;It is also linked to a failure of the reunification of the South (1967).&nbsp;This aspect is rarely discussed in media, as the focus rests on the regional aspect of the conflict due to its more sectarian and destructive effect. In this regard, it is critical to be mindful of the complex social and tribal fabric of Yemenite society, and the history of armed conflict and civil unrest in the country.&nbsp;Over the past eight decades in Yemen, the country has witnessed more than 18 armed conflicts; that is approximately a new conflict every five year,&nbsp;A stark reminder of Jean Giraudoux&#39;s historic words about the notion of peace, as an interval between two wars.

But Yemen, gradually loses its state attributes, whether for the benefit of its regional allies or that of non-state&nbsp;entities. The country is administered&nbsp;in the North&nbsp;by a&nbsp;De facto government in Sanaa (Houthis and their allies),&nbsp;in the South it remains under the control of a De jure government (from&nbsp;Ryadh and Aden) competed by its contingent ally&nbsp;namely&nbsp;the&nbsp;Southern Transitional Council (STC)&nbsp;and&nbsp;some &laquo;&nbsp;proto local governments&nbsp;&raquo;&nbsp;including&nbsp;in&nbsp;Hadramout.

The&nbsp;legitimate&nbsp;government&#39;s role, is reduced to&nbsp;protocolary&nbsp;prerogatives, and&nbsp;it&nbsp;no longer exerts effective sovereignty over its own so-called &quot;liberated&quot; territories.&nbsp;According to the latest UN panel experts on Yemen report, published in January 2018, the legitimate government is not able to govern the country from abroad, and the panel warns against the proliferation&nbsp;&laquo;of independent operations of proxy military forces&nbsp;&raquo;&nbsp;backed by Saudi Arabia and AUE in the&nbsp;South.

Indeed, the coalition seems to deviate from its original&nbsp;&laquo;&nbsp;mandate &raquo;&nbsp;(to restore the &quot;legitimacy&quot; and&nbsp;disarm Houthi rebels). At least two increasingly contradictory agendas have emerged on the ground, on one hand the Saudi, more concerned by the Houthis and iranian issue, and the other hand, UAE acting as an occupying force over islands and port cities of the South, and who supports the STC and other non-State armed groups openly against the&nbsp;&laquo;&nbsp;Legitimate government&nbsp;&raquo;.

The recent tensions between the legitimate government and the UAE - after its military deployment in Socotra -&nbsp; is a perfect example not only of a lack of coordination between the Hadi government and the coalition but is also a serious violation of the sovereignty of the Yemeni state.

Moreover, the legitimate government no longer has the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. Between 100 and 120 million pieces of weapon circulate in the country, for 27 million inhabitants. Also, the formation of non-state armed groups: In the north the Ansar Allah (Houthis) supported by the revolutionary committees, and in the South the southern popular committees and movements that fight the Houthis. To this must be added AQAP forces, and what has been named: the national army, formed to support the legitimate government. It is not a real army, but a cluster of militias, and mercenaries - who have nothing in common except the uniform.

The chains of command do not always go back to the ministry of the Yemenite defense, but directly to the coalition, (joint command or Saudi or Emirati) and sometimes certain armed groups are under a strictly local command. It should be remembered that The Yemenite army was considerably weakened as a result of the post-Arab spring reshuffling, the six wars&nbsp;of Saa&#39;da (1004-2010) and the civil war (1994). The former President Ali Abdellah Saleh built the Yemeni armed forces on very fragile pillars, which allowed its rapid collapse following the restructuring of the army. The reforms undertaken by Hadi&nbsp;aimed at purging the Saleh family network within the armed forces, who evidently held high positions in the military institution and within the security forces. This largely explains the division of the army following the conflict. Many defected or deserted, around 15000 joined the Houthis, and 50% of the units that were in the South and the Est (Hadramut and al-M&eacute;hara) supported Hadi, or at least were against the Houthis.

The Yemeni state is losing its regalian prerogatives as the conflict is fragmenting. The Yemeni central bank, which is unlocalized in Aden, and administered from abroad (Amman, Jordan) strengthens the financial dependence to Yemen&#39;s allies and consequently&nbsp;this dissolution process.

&nbsp;

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Yemen: From a fragmentation of the conflict to a dissolution of the State - Part I

The fragmentation of Yemen is fractal, as it affects all levels of the system, political parties included. Firstly, a deep division characterizes the political landscape in Yemen, in particular regarding questions related to intervention and sovereignty, most importantly, on supporting or opposing military intervention.

In reality, it is far from a binary question, despite appearing to be so prima facie appearance. Among the pro-intervention actors in the Yemenite conflict, we must distinguish between the pro-Saudi and pro-Emirati. Furthermore, there are differences related to both the relationship of the legitimate government (i.e.pro-Hadi and anti-Hadi) and the Houthi question (i.e. being pro-Houthi, or anti- Houthi, indifferent). To this, must be added another line of fracture, related to the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and his family network (i.e. pro-Saleh, anti-Saleh). Secondly, the thorny question of the South, which divides the political parties between unionists and separatists. Within the separatists, there are those who advocate independence of the South, and those who prefer a federal system. And in-between, the middleground, there is a voice for a gradual independence (usually described as federal system with an increasing autonomy geared towards independence). The fractal crack touches all the political components of the country, with the exception of the Ansar Allah (Houthis) who remain welded by strong ideological principles, and mobilised around the charismatic person of AbdelMalik al-Houthi. All the other parties/actors are internally divided.

The General People&#39;s Congress party (GPC), founded in 1982 by A.A. Saleh, was the dominant political party in Yemen since the reunification in 1990. After the Youth Revolution/Arab Spring, however, there have been well-known schisms within the party, mainly with two branches centered around Saleh and Hadi. The divisions continued with the military intervention, and were accentuated with the assassination of A.A. Saleh in December 2017. The party is now divided into - at least - five tendencies. To illustrate the geopolitical and national Yemenite dynamics of the tendencies, they are mentioned below in relation to their geographic base and internal political priorities. In Sana&#39;a the GPC opposes the Saudi-led military intervention. Since january 2018, its supreme political council is chaired by Sadiq Abu Rass who is close to the Houthis. There is also the branch of president Hadi, now based in Ryadh, who is against the Houthis and supports the military intervention.

In Cairo, there are great historical personalities of the party of which Sheikh Sultan al-Barakani, or al-Qerbi support the intervention, and keep links with the Saleh family in the Emirates. In Beirut, Yahia Saleh, adopts a more or less median position.

Meanwhile, in Abu Dhabi, Ahmad Ali Saleh (son of the former president), opposes both the legitimate government of Hadi and the Houthis, to survive politically and militarily he resorts to an alliance of circumstance with some southerners fractions, and the UAE. Al-Islah (The Reform Party - Muslim Brotherhood) is very sensitive to the Gulf crisis, it has opportunistically and pragmatically adapted its alliances. The party is divided between two internal trends, the San&#39;a branch, which is opposing the military intervention, and the Riyadh branch, which remains closely affiliated to President Hadi, and thus supports the intervention. There is another branch, however, known as the Istanbul branch, which is led by Khaled al-Anessi, Tawakul Kerman, and Shawqi al-Qadhi, who have shifted their positions, and are now aligned with the Qatari policy position which opposes the military intervention. And finally, the secondary and somewhat marginalised leaders based in Khartoum, Sudan, who do not support the intervention.

The Southern movement is no exception to the rule, it is also very fragmented. The following political parties and blocs are most prominent. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is led by Aidaruss al Zubaidi. It was created in 2017, advocating independence as a political objective, and is supported by the UAE. Their policy is in contradiction with the legitimate government&#39;s position on the territorial integrity of Yemen. There is also al-Hizam al-Amni under the command of Salafist leaders, such as Hani Ben Brik who is at the same time vice president of the STC. To this must added the Southern Revolutionary Movement (Hirak a-Thawri al- Janubi), led by Fadi Ba&rsquo;oum (based in Oman). The movement is not involved in the armed conflict directly, but is against the military intervention, and advocates independence of the South while maintaining good relations with the Houtis in San&rsquo;aa.

Moreover, the are three other southern movements, known as Southern movement of Ali Ba Thawab, a socialist trend, TAJ movement or Tajamu al- Demoqrati al-Janubi (The Southern Democratic Assembly) and TAA (Tajamu &#39;Abna&#39; Aden) the last one oppose the military intervention, and is open to dialogue with the Houthis. Furthermore, there is a pacifist movement known as al-Hirak al-Silmi, which is based in Sanaa, chaired by Khaled Abu Bakr Baras. The movement is against the intervention, and is closely affiliated to the Houthis. And finally, the Mu&#39;tamar al-Hadramout (the Hadramout Conference), which has separatist claims and advocates for the independence of Hadramout region, and is mainly supported by UAE.

Regarding the Pan-Arab left parties, it can be mentioned that they are all divided between Baathists and Nasserists. The Baathists have two opposing tendencies, one shaped on the Syrian model, and one influenced by the former Iraqi model. The Nasserites have a trend that opposes the military intervention and a trend which is closely affiliated to president Hadi - occupying several ministerial and advisory positions in his government.

There are also other factors which reinforce these fractured lines: for example between secularist/ Islamist, traditionalist/modernist orientations...etc. It is important here to clarify that the relationship between the regional &quot;geopolitical stakeholders&quot;, and the Yemeni political parties is not always one-sided, i.e., they are based on transactional relationships, and of a give-and-take nature - which means that they are not just puppets in the hands of regional actors. There are currently tensions between the STC and UAE for example. The same holds true for the Houthis, who despite their close ties with Iran, remain attached to their ancestral culture, Zeydism and have a wide and free maneuver for autonomous action.

The longer the war persists, the more - paradoxically - it reinforces local forces and makes them stronger, in term of technical, tactical, financial, and recruitment capabilities. The geopolitical stakeholders&#39; direct support to these armed factions is a strong and detrimental factor of the current fragmentation. Even if it gives the false illusion of having a unifying effect, in the sense of virtually bringing armed factions under an umbrella of a single coalition. If nothing is done, the situation will reach a point of no return, namely that of the end of the Yemeni state as such. Repeating and cementing nightmare dynamics similar to those seen in Iraq and Libya. At this stage, after more than three years of conflict, it will no longer be possible to return to &quot;the unitary model&quot;, the people of South Yemen, will never accept such a retreat, which augurs a new front against Hadi&#39;s government. This being said, the Southern parties are deeply divided, and risk plunging into a fratricidal war similar to all postcolonial conflicts, with conflicts linked to the delineation of borders, tribal dynamics, the distribution of wealth, control of the sea ports and regions, and likely serious international or regional repercutions.

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Yemen: From a fragmentation of the conflict to a dissolution of the State - Part II

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5 Questions à Maxime Chaix sur l'Etat Profond

Groenland: en route vers l'indépendance?

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5 Questions à Ghislain de Castelbajac sur Mohammed ben Salman

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5 Questions à Alexandre Del Valle sur le Brexit

Terrorist threat spread across many fronts

Since 2017, Iran is considered as highly exposed to the jihadist threat. Since the beginning of the year, the IS has multiplied the messages with regard to Tehran, in what is considered by the jihadist organization as a religious war between Sunnis and Shiites. In March, the terrorist group published a video which&nbsp; directly provoked Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and said that it will &quot;conquer Iran and return it to the Sunni Muslim nation&quot;.

Today, Iran faces this threat on several fronts. The country is threatened in the West, along its border with Iraq, where the Islamic State has established itself. The regime&#39;s priority is to prevent jihadists from crossing the border and attacking neighboring provinces. In the West, Iran is also concerned about Iranian Kurdistan, where the terrorists who attacked Teheran originated. Radicalization is not a new phenomenon in the provinces of Iranian Kurdistan, which since 2003 has been influenced by neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan. As a result, this region is particularly watched over by the Iranian authorities. On the other hand, the country is threatened in the East on the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan, in the province of Sistan-Baluchistan, especially affected by poverty and trafficking. What was historically a separatism of the Baluchi people has evolved into terrorism, facilitated by the porous borders and resources associated with drug trafficking. Today, the rebels of the East claim to be jihadists, like the group Jaish al-Adl, which continues the attacks in Sistan-Baluchistan.

On the other hand, the terrorist threat is spreading in Iran on another front: the internal front. The Iranian citizens seize the subject and may in turn constitute a threat, as evidenced by the nationality of the perpetrators of the attacks of 7 June. Iranian journalist Mariam Pirzadeh says: &quot;This country is very secure, it is a fortress in the middle of chaos of the Middle East. What is happening today shows that we are entering a new era. &quot;Daesh understood the infiltrated role that Iranian Sunnis can play in its fight against Tehran. This year, propaganda targeting this population has increased, in Farsi ...

However, with the backing of the Islamic State, if the threat that Daesh represents is still present, it is necessary to underline that it is running out of steam. With 10,000 to 15,000 troops on Syrian soil in late 2016, Iran has largely participated in IS&#39;s military defeat.

Measures implemented and recommendations

In the days following the attacks, the Iranian authorities claimed to have foiled several attacks, and to have tightened border controls, by establishing a 40-kilometer buffer zone with Iraq. Iran is implementing a reinforced global security throughout its territory. Nevertheless, if the fight against terrorism is paramount at the regional level, the Iranian regime must devote a real effort to the integration of the Sunni minority in the population, an essential element of the fight against terrorism.

International companies that establish economic activities in Iran are fully aware of the level of the threat ... From a&nbsp; security point of view, Iran is, in the words of Mariam Pirzadeh, &quot;one of the safest countries in the world&quot;&hellip; Testimonies of tourists and expatriates, more and more numerous in Iran since the partial lifting of the sanctions in January 2016, corroborate this affirmation, and mention the impact of the very large numbers of the police and the army.

However, in the context of terrorist threats, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advises travelers traveling to Iran to exercise greater vigilance when traveling, especially around the busy sites of major cities. It is strongly advised to stay away from any gathering, demonstration, ceremony, procession or crowd movement, whether it is authorized events or not. In addition, the &lsquo;Quai d&#39;Orsay&rsquo; has drawn up a map of risks in Iran and recommends to postpone any unnecessary movement in the orange zone, the red zone being formally discouraged.

Anyway, in early 2018, Iran is at a turning point, which is the question of the succession of Supreme Leader Imam Khamenei&hellip;

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Terrorism Threat in Iran?

George Soros est un homme de paradoxes. Il est&nbsp;&acirc;g&eacute; de 13 ans en 1944, quand les nazis envahissent la Hongrie, il est profond&eacute;ment marqu&eacute; par cette p&eacute;riode.&nbsp;En 1947, il fuit la Hongrie communiste pour rejoindre Londres, et &eacute;migre vers les Etats-Unis 9 ans plus tard. C&#39;est en 1970 qu&#39;il fonde Soros Fund Management, premi&egrave;re pierre de l&#39;empire qu&#39;il b&acirc;tira dans les d&eacute;cennies qui suivront. Durant sa scolarit&eacute; &agrave; la London School of Economics, il fait la rencontre du philosophe des sciences Karl Popper, avec qui il se lie d&#39;amiti&eacute; et dont l&#39;ouvrage &laquo;&nbsp;The Open Society and Its Enemies&nbsp;&raquo; servira de manifeste &agrave; la fondation philanthropique que Soros cr&eacute;e en 1979. Cette derni&egrave;re sera principalement d&eacute;di&eacute;e &agrave; la promotion de la justice et du droit des minorit&eacute;s. 12 ans plus tard, pourtant, le magnat de la charit&eacute; empoche un milliard d&#39;euros en misant contre le pound britannique. Comment comprendre la logique d&#39;un homme dont la fortune est issue du monde de la finance, mais n&eacute;anmoins d&eacute;di&eacute; &agrave; la promotion de valeurs au c&oelig;ur desquelles tr&ocirc;nent la d&eacute;mocratie, le droit des plus pauvres, et la lutte contre l&#39;obscurantisme&nbsp;?

Soros a, depuis les ann&eacute;es 1990, publi&eacute; de fa&ccedil;on r&eacute;guli&egrave;re des ouvrages dans lesquels il d&eacute;crit la menace que repr&eacute;sente le syst&egrave;me &eacute;conomique mondialis&eacute; moderne. Dans son ouvrage &laquo;&nbsp;The Alchemy of Finance&nbsp;&raquo;, publi&eacute; en 1998, le philanthrope r&eacute;sume ses conclusions id&eacute;ologiques sous la forme de trois axes&nbsp;: les march&eacute;s financiers sont par essence amoraux, le syst&egrave;me est manipul&eacute; par une petite caste, et l&#39;&eacute;conomie est une science perfide. Quoi qu&#39;il en soit, Soros se pr&eacute;sente comme le plus grand robin des bois de l&#39;histoire&nbsp;: sa fortune est, depuis quelques ann&eacute;es, massivement inject&eacute;e dans sa fondation &laquo;&nbsp;Open Society&nbsp;&raquo;. Dot&eacute;e de 18 milliards de dollars issus de la fortune personnelle de Soros, elle est pr&eacute;sente dans une centaine de pays, et a la particularit&eacute; d&#39;agir pour des causes &eacute;minemment politiques, &agrave; contre-courant des engagements philanthropiques classiques d&eacute;di&eacute;s &agrave; la sant&eacute;.

Le biographe attitr&eacute; de George Soros, Michael T. Kaufmann, d&eacute;crit un homme qui se sent investi de pouvoirs extraordinaires, presque divins. De son exp&eacute;rience du r&eacute;gime Nazi et des premi&egrave;res heures du communisme sovi&eacute;tique, Soros semble tirer un amour pour la libert&eacute; qui explique sa lutte acharn&eacute;e pour la d&eacute;mocratie. Open Society Fondation (OSF) est par beaucoup consid&eacute;r&eacute;e comme &eacute;tant la plus influente organisation philanthropique du monde. Or, pilot&eacute;e par Soros au travers de son bras droit Patrick Gaspard, elle a la particularit&eacute; de ne pas d&eacute;pendre des processus d&eacute;mocratiques qu&#39;elle cherche pr&eacute;cis&eacute;ment &agrave; promouvoir. Pr&eacute;sente dans plus de 100 pays, OSF a, &agrave; bien des &eacute;gards, les caract&eacute;ristiques d&#39;une organisation peu transparente bien que tr&egrave;s engag&eacute;e.

En 2017, le site DCleaks &ndash; disparu depuis &ndash; r&eacute;v&egrave;le pr&egrave;s de 3000 documents internes d&#39;OSF qui d&eacute;crivent en d&eacute;tail les objectifs et les m&eacute;thodes de l&#39;organisation. Ils font notamment &eacute;tat de l&#39;ampleur des leviers politiques et financiers dont elle dispose, et la proximit&eacute; de son fondateur avec nombre de dirigeants du monde alimente des soup&ccedil;ons aux teintes conspirationnistes. Le 15 mai dernier, l&#39;organisation a annonc&eacute; son d&eacute;part de Hongrie &agrave; l&#39;issue d&#39;une lourde campagne de d&eacute;nigrement orchestr&eacute;e par le Premier ministre Victor Orban, qui a fait de Soros la cible principale de ses critiques en raison de la politique pro-migratoire du philanthrope. Le pouvoir de ce dernier semble ainsi faire peur &agrave; certains gouvernants du monde, pr&eacute;cis&eacute;ment parce que l&#39;&eacute;norme manne financi&egrave;re &agrave; la disposition d&#39;OSF sert &agrave; la promotion d&#39;une certaine vision du monde.

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George Soros : Portrait d'un milliardaire activiste aux motivations complexes

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Groenland: en route vers l'indépendance?

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