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5 Questions à Alexandre Del Valle sur son Livre "la stratégie de l'intimidation"

Depuis la chute du Mur et les fameux &laquo;&nbsp;dividendes de la paix&nbsp;&raquo;, toutes les LPM se sont efforc&eacute;es &laquo;&nbsp;d&rsquo;organiser&nbsp;&raquo; les effets de la d&eacute;croissance des cr&eacute;dits&hellip; Et en particulier, de limiter les d&eacute;g&acirc;ts caus&eacute;s par la pratique de Bercy consistant &agrave; puiser dans les lignes r&eacute;serv&eacute;es &agrave; la D&eacute;fense pour compenser les d&eacute;rapages de l&rsquo;ex&eacute;cution des lois de finances annuelles - avec l&rsquo;aval des politiques, de droite comme de gauche.

Cette fois, avec un budget annuel moyen de 39,6 milliards d&rsquo;euros par an sur la p&eacute;riode 2019-2023, l&rsquo;augmentation repr&eacute;sente un suppl&eacute;ment 7,4 milliards par an, compar&eacute; &agrave; la p&eacute;riode 2014-2019. C&rsquo;est beaucoup, mais une partie servira &agrave; financer des d&eacute;penses suppl&eacute;mentaires&nbsp;: le surco&ucirc;t des op&eacute;rations ext&eacute;rieures (Opex&nbsp;: plus 1,3 milliards d&rsquo;euros en 2018) jusqu&rsquo;alors largement &agrave; la charge de l&rsquo;interminist&eacute;riel&nbsp;; les d&eacute;cisions de remont&eacute;e en puissance prises dans la foul&eacute;e des attentats de 2015&nbsp;(notamment les soldes des postes non supprim&eacute;s).

Pour le reste, &agrave; quoi servira cet effort&nbsp;? D&rsquo;abord, &agrave; sauver litt&eacute;ralement un mod&egrave;le complet d&rsquo;arm&eacute;es. Il craquait de toutes parts du fait de la r&eacute;duction des formats et de la hausse simultan&eacute;e des sollicitations. Priorit&eacute; sera donn&eacute;e &agrave; l&rsquo;entretien des mat&eacute;riels et &agrave; l&rsquo;acc&eacute;l&eacute;ration de sa modernisation&nbsp;: renouvellement des blind&eacute;s m&eacute;dians de l&rsquo;arm&eacute;e de Terre (le programme Scorpion), des avions ravitailleurs de l&rsquo;arm&eacute;e de l&rsquo;Air (MRTT) indispensables &agrave; l&rsquo;autonomie de notre dissuasion nucl&eacute;aire, ou encore des p&eacute;troliers-ravitailleurs hors d&rsquo;&acirc;ge de la Marine nationale.

Proc&eacute;dant du m&ecirc;me esprit, cette LPM &laquo;&nbsp;&agrave; hauteur d&rsquo;homme&nbsp;&raquo; mettra pour la premi&egrave;re fois l&rsquo;accent sur les petits programmes d&rsquo;&eacute;quipement du combattant et sur les infrastructures de vie, deux variables traditionnelles d&rsquo;ajustement budg&eacute;taire. Ainsi, tous les combattants en op&eacute;ration disposeront du nouveau treillis ignifug&eacute; et du gilet pare-balle de derni&egrave;re g&eacute;n&eacute;ration. Les cr&eacute;dits consacr&eacute;s &agrave; la pr&eacute;paration op&eacute;rationnelle sont par ailleurs revus &agrave; la hausse.

En mati&egrave;re d&rsquo;&eacute;quipements structurants, enfin, la LPM affiche deux grandes ambitions&nbsp;: renouveler et moderniser la force de dissuasion&nbsp;; consolider les moyens d&eacute;volus aux fonctions strat&eacute;giques &laquo;&nbsp;Connaissance anticipation&nbsp;&raquo; et &laquo;&nbsp;Pr&eacute;vention&nbsp;&raquo;. Pour la premi&egrave;re, cela signifie davantage de capteurs humains et techniques (des avions de surveillance de th&eacute;&acirc;tre jusqu&rsquo;aux engins spatiaux&nbsp;: + 4,5 milliards d&rsquo;euros). Pour la seconde, cela se traduit par le lancement du programme des vedettes de surveillance c&ocirc;ti&egrave;re Batsimar de la Marine nationale dont la cible passe de 17&nbsp;&agrave; 19, ou le renforcement du dispositif des forces fran&ccedil;aises stationn&eacute;es &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;tranger.

Op&eacute;rationnels, industriels et parlementaire crient victoire. C&rsquo;est un peu t&ocirc;t, tant une LPM demeure un exercice th&eacute;orique, et son sort soumis &agrave; l&rsquo;ex&eacute;cution des lois de finances.

Le premier rendez-vous de sinc&eacute;rit&eacute; est donc fix&eacute; &agrave; l&rsquo;automne 2018. Chacun aura toutefois not&eacute; que la plus forte hausse de cr&eacute;dit interviendra apr&egrave;s la fin du quinquennat Macron. Les promesses n&rsquo;engagent que ceux qui les re&ccedil;oivent&hellip;

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Défense: Loi de programation militaire 2019-2025. Ne nous réjouissons pas trop vite…

Des &eacute;lections l&eacute;gislatives irakiennes, qui se sont tenues le samedi 12 mai, ce n&rsquo;est pas le r&eacute;sultat du Premier ministre sortant Ha&iuml;dar al-Abadi, dont la liste est arriv&eacute;e en t&ecirc;te, que l&rsquo;on retiendra en priorit&eacute;. Mais d&rsquo;abord le retour en force d&rsquo;un certain nationalisme comme le montre le succ&egrave;s inattendu de la liste du mouvement de l&rsquo;imam populiste Moqtada al-Sadr et le pr&ecirc;che, peu avant le scrutin, du grand ayatollah (ayatollah ozma) Ali al-Hussein al-Sistani qui, non content de sermonner les candidats pour leur corruption et leur sectarisme a plaid&eacute; pour un Irak s&eacute;culier.

De Moqtada al-Sadr, on se souvient qu&rsquo;il avait &eacute;t&eacute; l&rsquo;un des plus vigoureux adversaires des Etats-Unis pendant leur occupation de l&rsquo;Irak (2003-2011). Lui-m&ecirc;me tire en grande partie son autorit&eacute; de sa famille&nbsp;: son p&egrave;re, le tr&egrave;s respect&eacute; ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, a &eacute;t&eacute; assassin&eacute; en 1999 pour s&#39;&ecirc;tre oppos&eacute; &agrave; Saddam Hussein. Le cousin de son p&egrave;re, l&rsquo;ayatollah Mohammed al-Bakr, qui fut l&rsquo;un des th&eacute;oriciens de la R&eacute;publique islamique iranienne, a &eacute;t&eacute; &eacute;galement tu&eacute; en 1980 par le d&eacute;funt ra&iuml;s. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, Moqtada est l&rsquo;un des rares dirigeants politiques chiites &agrave; avoir pris ses distances avec l&#39;Iran. Pour &eacute;largir les soutiens dont il dispose, il a m&ecirc;me os&eacute; rendre visite au prince h&eacute;ritier saoudien, Mohammed ben Salman, l&rsquo;alli&eacute; arabe de Washington dont on conna&icirc;t l&rsquo;hostilit&eacute; &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;gard de T&eacute;h&eacute;ran. Il s&rsquo;est aussi prononc&eacute; pour la s&eacute;paration de l&rsquo;Etat et de la religion et contre l&rsquo;actuelle Constitution impos&eacute;e par les Etats-Unis.

Baptis&eacute;e Sayroun (&laquo;&nbsp;La Marche &raquo;), la liste du bouillant religieux est arriv&eacute;e en t&ecirc;te du scrutin. Pour autant, il ne sera sans doute pas le prochain chef de gouvernement &agrave; la fois en raison du jeu des alliances &ndash; une quarantaine pour quelque 200 listes -, qui lui est d&eacute;favorable, et du veto que ne manqueraient pas d&rsquo;opposer T&eacute;h&eacute;ran et Washington, les deux parrains de l&rsquo;actuel Irak.

N&eacute;anmoins, sa perc&eacute;e &ndash; il est arriv&eacute; en t&ecirc;te &agrave; Bagdad - signifie qu&rsquo;une partie importante de la population est fatigu&eacute;e du sectarisme qui p&egrave;se &agrave; tous les niveaux de la vie politique, &eacute;conomique et sociale, du poids accablant des groupes paramilitaires chiites, de l&rsquo;omnipr&eacute;sence iranienne &agrave; travers ces milices, m&ecirc;me si la victoire sur l&rsquo;Etat islamique doit beaucoup &agrave; T&eacute;h&eacute;ran. S&rsquo;ajoute la corruption omnipr&eacute;sente que l&rsquo;imam Moqtada ne cesse de pourfendre, ses partisans se rassemblant chaque semaine &agrave; travers tout le pays et la nuit &agrave; Bagdad pour la d&eacute;noncer.

Pour bien montrer son attachement au s&eacute;cularisme, le leader chiite a m&ecirc;me r&eacute;alis&eacute; une alliance totalement in&eacute;dite avec le parti communiste irakien (qui fut le plus important du monde arabe jusqu&rsquo;&agrave; la prise du pouvoir par Saddam Hussein). A ses d&eacute;tracteurs qui lui reprochaient un tel accord avec des &laquo;&nbsp;m&eacute;cr&eacute;ants&nbsp;&raquo;, il a r&eacute;pondu que les affaires terrestres et celles du ciel &eacute;taient bien distinctes.

Bien s&ucirc;r, T&eacute;h&eacute;ran n&rsquo;a pas disparu du paysage politique. Les milices chiites, sous la coupe des p&acirc;sd&acirc;r&acirc;n (Gardiens de la r&eacute;volution), maillent toujours le pays. Et elles se sont taill&eacute;es un certain succ&egrave;s aux &eacute;lections en constituant une liste qui est arriv&eacute;e en troisi&egrave;me position. Cette liste est l&rsquo;&eacute;manation de Hachd al-Chaab (les Forces de la mobilisation populaire), la coalition des groupes paramilitaires qui a affront&eacute; l&rsquo;Etat islamique. Si Hachd al-Chaab s&rsquo;est constitu&eacute;e en liste, c&rsquo;est pour peser sur la vie politique et pr&eacute;tendre au pouvoir. Elle est conduite par Hadi al-Amiri, l&rsquo;un des hommes de T&eacute;h&eacute;ran sur la sc&egrave;ne irakienne. R&eacute;fugi&eacute; en Iran, il avait combattu aux c&ocirc;t&eacute;s des forces de T&eacute;h&eacute;ran dans la guerre avec l&rsquo;Irak (1980-1988) et n&rsquo;est revenu en Irak qu&rsquo;apr&egrave;s la chute de Saddam Hussein. Pourtant, m&ecirc;me chez lui, on note un certain recentrage, une prise de distance &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;gard de T&eacute;h&eacute;ran.

Pour en revenir au Premier ministre sortant, Ha&iuml;dar al-Abadi, lui aussi campe sur des positions nettement plus nationalistes que son pr&eacute;d&eacute;cesseur Nouri al-Maleki, &eacute;galement l&rsquo;un des hommes de T&eacute;h&eacute;ran en Irak, et qui appara&icirc;t comme le grand perdant du scrutin.

L&rsquo;autre grande surprise de ces &eacute;lections est donc venue du grand ayatollah Ali Sistani, la personnalit&eacute;&nbsp;a priori la moins susceptible d&rsquo;incarner le changement. &Agrave; pr&egrave;s de 90 ans, ce dignitaire religieux d&rsquo;origine iranienne, de loin le plus respect&eacute; du monde chiite, a d&eacute;fendu une vision de l&rsquo;Irak aux antipodes de celles de la plupart des candidats chiites, avec une profession de foi r&eacute;solument&hellip; moderniste et anti-communautariste. Et lui aussi a jet&eacute; lui aussi une pierre dans le jardin de l&rsquo;Iran en d&eacute;non&ccedil;ant, &eacute;videmment &agrave; mots couverts, les ing&eacute;rences de la r&eacute;publique islamique - en revanche, sur la question des m&oelig;urs, il demeure des plus r&eacute;trogrades.

Ces deux hirondelles que sont Moqtada al-Sadr et Ali Sistani ne feront pas le printemps &agrave; Bagdad mais au moins elles font bouger les lignes que l&rsquo;on pouvait penser fig&eacute;es pour longtemps. Mais une autre inqui&eacute;tude perce &agrave; pr&eacute;sent&nbsp;avec la d&eacute;nonciation par les Etats-Unis de l&#39;accord sur le programme nucl&eacute;aire iranien. Une menace de plus sur le fragile &eacute;quilibre irakien.

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Irak: le grand retour du nationalisme

Depuis le d&eacute;but de 2015, ann&eacute;e des &eacute;lections l&eacute;gislatives post-r&eacute;volution, les deux forces politiques n&acute;ont obtenu que de pi&egrave;tres r&eacute;sultats &eacute;conomiques et sociaux. Le ch&ocirc;mage et l&acute;inflation ont progress&eacute;. Le m&eacute;contentement social, aussi. Mais, ce ph&eacute;nom&egrave;ne n&acute;a pas &eacute;rod&eacute; l&acute;adh&eacute;sion des tunisiens aux valeurs religieuses. La religion prime et le mouvement Ennahda y puise l&acute;essence m&ecirc;me qui nourrit son existence.

Une organisation rigoureuse et m&eacute;thodique a permis &agrave; Ennahda de s&acute;implanter sur tout le territoire national. Sa base est sa force. Avec des cadres, des militants et des moyens financiers &agrave; faire rougir les meilleures repr&eacute;sentations d&eacute;mocratiques au Maghreb...

Avec un mode de scrutin &agrave; la proportionnelle, l&acute;islam politique n&acute;a pas cependant pas pu brasser la majorit&eacute; &agrave; l&acute;assembl&eacute;e nationale. Oblig&eacute; de composer avec les progressistes de Nidaa Tounes, son ennemi jur&eacute;, la formation islamiste a d&eacute;montr&eacute; que le &quot;Mur&quot; est franchissable pour arriver &agrave; ses fins. Les ennemis d&#39;hier travaillent d&eacute;sormais ensemble, et ce depuis plus de trois ans. Le pr&eacute;sident B&eacute;ji Ca&iuml;d Essebsi et Cheikh Ghannouchi donnent l&#39;image d&#39;un duo qui codirige le pays.

Le spectre d&#39;une Tunisie gouvern&eacute;e par les islamistes ne se pointe donc toujours pas &aacute; l&acute;horizon. Seules l&#39;abstention, comme ce fut le cas pour les municipales ce mois de mai, et les querelles de chefs chez leurs opposants peuvent doper les adeptes religieux en 2019, lors des &eacute;lections pr&eacute;sidentielles tunisiennes.

&nbsp;La base du parti islamiste Ennahda repr&eacute;sente 1 million de voix. Un chiffre inqui&eacute;tant quand seulement trois, sur les cinq millions d&acute;&eacute;lecteurs votent lors des rendez-vous &eacute;lectoraux. Cependant, cet islam politique est en reflux. Pour subsister, rester au pouvoir, il tente donc de trouver une nouvelle raison politique d&#39;exister, celle d&acute;&ecirc;tre au service de la principale exigence populaire, c&#39;est &agrave; dire les droits et les libert&eacute;s individuelles et collectives. Ainsi, il n&acute;est pas rare, aujourd&acute;hui, que le d&eacute;bat &agrave; la faveur des libert&eacute;s des femmes en g&eacute;n&eacute;ral, comme celles de ne pas porter le Hijab et le divorce, celles de la tol&eacute;rance comme la consommation de l&acute;alcool, par exemple, tournent au Show politique dans les rencontres organis&eacute;es par les islamistes. Evidemment, les cheikhs d&acute;Ennahda y puisent, aujourd&acute;hui, leurs nouvelles fausses r&eacute;formes afin de s&eacute;duire la majorit&eacute; silencieuse.

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Tunisie: Ennahda tente de se réinventer

5 Questions à Maxime Chaix sur l'Etat Profond

Passons rapidement sur la fragilit&eacute; du cadre juridique des frappes. Apr&egrave;s tout, la puissance d&rsquo;un Etat continue &agrave; se mesurer &agrave; l&rsquo;aune de sa capacit&eacute; &agrave; employer la force pour faire valoir ses int&eacute;r&ecirc;ts quand il l&rsquo;a d&eacute;cid&eacute;&nbsp;; l&rsquo;intervention militaire russe en Syrie l&rsquo;illustre parfaitement. Dans cette terrible guerre civile (350 000 morts), du chlore a &eacute;t&eacute; utilis&eacute; - et ce, par tous les bellig&eacute;rants. En revanche, les services sp&eacute;cialis&eacute;s n&rsquo;ont &laquo;&nbsp;pas grand chose&nbsp;&raquo; pour &eacute;tayer les all&eacute;gations d&rsquo;emploi de Sarin, ce chimique de guerre dont on peut pourtant d&eacute;tecter la pr&eacute;sence (voir d&eacute;terminer la signature du fabricant) dans des tissus humains jusqu&rsquo;&agrave; pr&egrave;s d&rsquo;un mois apr&egrave;s le d&eacute;c&egrave;s de la victime. A fortiori, il est impossible de prouver la responsabilit&eacute; Bachar Al Assad. C&rsquo;est forte de son &laquo;&nbsp;haut degr&eacute; de confiance&nbsp;&raquo; dans cette double hypoth&egrave;se que la France est pass&eacute;e &agrave; l&rsquo;acte. Soit.

Officiellement, Paris a atteint ses objectifs militaires. Ses frappes auraient d&eacute;truit &laquo;&nbsp;l&rsquo;essentiel&nbsp;&raquo; du reliquat clandestin de l&rsquo;arsenal chimique de Bachar &laquo;&nbsp;dont nos services avaient connaissance&nbsp;&raquo;. Les missiles ont bien percut&eacute; des installations de stockage et de production identifi&eacute;es et suivies de longue date pr&egrave;s de Homs. Or, il est tr&egrave;s probable qu&rsquo;elles &eacute;taient inactives ou vides. Le raid avait &eacute;t&eacute; annonc&eacute; une semaine &agrave; l&rsquo;avance, Poutine pr&eacute;venu qu&rsquo;aucune installation vitale pour le r&eacute;gime&nbsp;de Bachar et ses alli&eacute;s ne serait cibl&eacute;e. Confiant, le ma&icirc;tre du Kremlin avait ordonn&eacute; &agrave; ses g&eacute;n&eacute;raux d&rsquo;&eacute;teindre les radars de tir de ses missiles sol-air S 400 prot&eacute;geant ses unit&eacute;s dans le pays. Au passage, on ne pourrait pas l&rsquo;accuser d&rsquo;&ecirc;tre &agrave; l&rsquo;origine d&rsquo;un regrettable &laquo;&nbsp;incident&nbsp;&raquo; aux cons&eacute;quences irr&eacute;m&eacute;diables. Il se serait m&ecirc;me r&eacute;joui, dit-on, que les Occidentaux aient administr&eacute; &agrave; sa place un avertissement sans frais &agrave; Bachar, qui aurait sciemment jou&eacute; avec la ligne rouge du chimique afin de bien signifier son ind&eacute;pendance &agrave; son puissance parrain.

L&rsquo;op&eacute;ration &laquo;&nbsp;Hamilton&nbsp;&raquo; aura-t-elle atteint ses vis&eacute;es politiques&nbsp;? Pour Washington et Paris, il fallait cr&eacute;dibiliser la d&eacute;claration sur la ligne rouge en mati&egrave;re d&rsquo;armes chimiques. Gr&acirc;ce &agrave; la convention de 1993 qui prohibe leur fabrication et leur stockage, ratifi&eacute;e par 192 Etats, dont la Syrie en 2013 sous la pression am&eacute;ricano-russe, &laquo;&nbsp;on &eacute;tait en passe d&rsquo;&eacute;radiquer ces saloperies&nbsp;&raquo;, justifient les experts. Seul l&rsquo;avenir dira si les frappes ont port&eacute; leurs fruits dans ce domaine. Pour le reste, elles ont &eacute;t&eacute; inutiles. Paris n&rsquo;influera pas sur le sort de la guerre. Elle est en passe de se solder par une victoire de Bachar et de ses alli&eacute;s. Ni sur l&rsquo;avenir de la paix. Parrains du processus d&rsquo;Astana, les Russes, les Turcs et les Iraniens n&rsquo;ont pas invit&eacute; Macron &agrave; les rejoindre. Reste &agrave; esp&eacute;rer que l&rsquo;Elys&eacute;e en tire quelques contreparties aupr&egrave;s de son ami Trump. Les dossiers sur la table ne manquent pas, en commen&ccedil;ant par l&rsquo;Iran.

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Frappes en Syrie : Quels bénéfices ?

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5 Questions à Ghislain de Castelbajac sur le retrait des Etats-Unis de l'accord nucléaire Iranien

Since the beginning of the&nbsp;saudi-led&nbsp;military operations in Yemen on 26th March 2015,&nbsp;the Republic of Yemen is facing the worst humanitarian, political, and security crisis in its modern history.&nbsp;The armed conflict has entered a phase of deeper fragmentation, which risks plunging the country into an interminable war, where warlords, terrorist organisations, and criminal networks find safe-havens.

On the &laquo;&nbsp;National level&nbsp;&raquo; Frontline between the Houthi rebels and their allies in the North, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate (UEA) backed forces in the south, on the other hand, remained mostly static&nbsp;and the dynamics of current armed conflict coincides with the old demarcation line between the two pre 1990s separate entities, a) Northern Yemen and b) Southern Yemen.&nbsp;On the regional level,&nbsp;New sub-conflicts and warfare dynamics have emerged, especially in the South. The current fragmentation of the conflict is a clear sign of the erosion of the State Unity.

The root causes of the conflict in Yemen remains linked to the failure of the reunification of the country in 1990, and that the Arab Spring&nbsp;(2011)&nbsp;merely surfaced underlying problems and grievances which had existed for over a decade.&nbsp;&nbsp;It is also linked to a failure of the reunification of the South (1967).&nbsp;This aspect is rarely discussed in media, as the focus rests on the regional aspect of the conflict due to its more sectarian and destructive effect. In this regard, it is critical to be mindful of the complex social and tribal fabric of Yemenite society, and the history of armed conflict and civil unrest in the country.&nbsp;Over the past eight decades in Yemen, the country has witnessed more than 18 armed conflicts; that is approximately a new conflict every five year,&nbsp;A stark reminder of Jean Giraudoux&#39;s historic words about the notion of peace, as an interval between two wars.

But Yemen, gradually loses its state attributes, whether for the benefit of its regional allies or that of non-state&nbsp;entities. The country is administered&nbsp;in the North&nbsp;by a&nbsp;De facto government in Sanaa (Houthis and their allies),&nbsp;in the South it remains under the control of a De jure government (from&nbsp;Ryadh and Aden) competed by its contingent ally&nbsp;namely&nbsp;the&nbsp;Southern Transitional Council (STC)&nbsp;and&nbsp;some &laquo;&nbsp;proto local governments&nbsp;&raquo;&nbsp;including&nbsp;in&nbsp;Hadramout.

The&nbsp;legitimate&nbsp;government&#39;s role, is reduced to&nbsp;protocolary&nbsp;prerogatives, and&nbsp;it&nbsp;no longer exerts effective sovereignty over its own so-called &quot;liberated&quot; territories.&nbsp;According to the latest UN panel experts on Yemen report, published in January 2018, the legitimate government is not able to govern the country from abroad, and the panel warns against the proliferation&nbsp;&laquo;of independent operations of proxy military forces&nbsp;&raquo;&nbsp;backed by Saudi Arabia and AUE in the&nbsp;South.

Indeed, the coalition seems to deviate from its original&nbsp;&laquo;&nbsp;mandate &raquo;&nbsp;(to restore the &quot;legitimacy&quot; and&nbsp;disarm Houthi rebels). At least two increasingly contradictory agendas have emerged on the ground, on one hand the Saudi, more concerned by the Houthis and iranian issue, and the other hand, UAE acting as an occupying force over islands and port cities of the South, and who supports the STC and other non-State armed groups openly against the&nbsp;&laquo;&nbsp;Legitimate government&nbsp;&raquo;.

The recent tensions between the legitimate government and the UAE - after its military deployment in Socotra -&nbsp; is a perfect example not only of a lack of coordination between the Hadi government and the coalition but is also a serious violation of the sovereignty of the Yemeni state.

Moreover, the legitimate government no longer has the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. Between 100 and 120 million pieces of weapon circulate in the country, for 27 million inhabitants. Also, the formation of non-state armed groups: In the north the Ansar Allah (Houthis) supported by the revolutionary committees, and in the South the southern popular committees and movements that fight the Houthis. To this must be added AQAP forces, and what has been named: the national army, formed to support the legitimate government. It is not a real army, but a cluster of militias, and mercenaries - who have nothing in common except the uniform.

The chains of command do not always go back to the ministry of the Yemenite defense, but directly to the coalition, (joint command or Saudi or Emirati) and sometimes certain armed groups are under a strictly local command. It should be remembered that The Yemenite army was considerably weakened as a result of the post-Arab spring reshuffling, the six wars&nbsp;of Saa&#39;da (1004-2010) and the civil war (1994). The former President Ali Abdellah Saleh built the Yemeni armed forces on very fragile pillars, which allowed its rapid collapse following the restructuring of the army. The reforms undertaken by Hadi&nbsp;aimed at purging the Saleh family network within the armed forces, who evidently held high positions in the military institution and within the security forces. This largely explains the division of the army following the conflict. Many defected or deserted, around 15000 joined the Houthis, and 50% of the units that were in the South and the Est (Hadramut and al-M&eacute;hara) supported Hadi, or at least were against the Houthis.

The Yemeni state is losing its regalian prerogatives as the conflict is fragmenting. The Yemeni central bank, which is unlocalized in Aden, and administered from abroad (Amman, Jordan) strengthens the financial dependence to Yemen&#39;s allies and consequently&nbsp;this dissolution process.

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Yemen: From a fragmentation of the conflict to a dissolution of the State - Part I

The fragmentation of Yemen is fractal, as it affects all levels of the system, political parties included. Firstly, a deep division characterizes the political landscape in Yemen, in particular regarding questions related to intervention and sovereignty, most importantly, on supporting or opposing military intervention.

In reality, it is far from a binary question, despite appearing to be so prima facie appearance. Among the pro-intervention actors in the Yemenite conflict, we must distinguish between the pro-Saudi and pro-Emirati. Furthermore, there are differences related to both the relationship of the legitimate government (i.e.pro-Hadi and anti-Hadi) and the Houthi question (i.e. being pro-Houthi, or anti- Houthi, indifferent). To this, must be added another line of fracture, related to the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and his family network (i.e. pro-Saleh, anti-Saleh). Secondly, the thorny question of the South, which divides the political parties between unionists and separatists. Within the separatists, there are those who advocate independence of the South, and those who prefer a federal system. And in-between, the middleground, there is a voice for a gradual independence (usually described as federal system with an increasing autonomy geared towards independence). The fractal crack touches all the political components of the country, with the exception of the Ansar Allah (Houthis) who remain welded by strong ideological principles, and mobilised around the charismatic person of AbdelMalik al-Houthi. All the other parties/actors are internally divided.

The General People&#39;s Congress party (GPC), founded in 1982 by A.A. Saleh, was the dominant political party in Yemen since the reunification in 1990. After the Youth Revolution/Arab Spring, however, there have been well-known schisms within the party, mainly with two branches centered around Saleh and Hadi. The divisions continued with the military intervention, and were accentuated with the assassination of A.A. Saleh in December 2017. The party is now divided into - at least - five tendencies. To illustrate the geopolitical and national Yemenite dynamics of the tendencies, they are mentioned below in relation to their geographic base and internal political priorities. In Sana&#39;a the GPC opposes the Saudi-led military intervention. Since january 2018, its supreme political council is chaired by Sadiq Abu Rass who is close to the Houthis. There is also the branch of president Hadi, now based in Ryadh, who is against the Houthis and supports the military intervention.

In Cairo, there are great historical personalities of the party of which Sheikh Sultan al-Barakani, or al-Qerbi support the intervention, and keep links with the Saleh family in the Emirates. In Beirut, Yahia Saleh, adopts a more or less median position.

Meanwhile, in Abu Dhabi, Ahmad Ali Saleh (son of the former president), opposes both the legitimate government of Hadi and the Houthis, to survive politically and militarily he resorts to an alliance of circumstance with some southerners fractions, and the UAE. Al-Islah (The Reform Party - Muslim Brotherhood) is very sensitive to the Gulf crisis, it has opportunistically and pragmatically adapted its alliances. The party is divided between two internal trends, the San&#39;a branch, which is opposing the military intervention, and the Riyadh branch, which remains closely affiliated to President Hadi, and thus supports the intervention. There is another branch, however, known as the Istanbul branch, which is led by Khaled al-Anessi, Tawakul Kerman, and Shawqi al-Qadhi, who have shifted their positions, and are now aligned with the Qatari policy position which opposes the military intervention. And finally, the secondary and somewhat marginalised leaders based in Khartoum, Sudan, who do not support the intervention.

The Southern movement is no exception to the rule, it is also very fragmented. The following political parties and blocs are most prominent. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is led by Aidaruss al Zubaidi. It was created in 2017, advocating independence as a political objective, and is supported by the UAE. Their policy is in contradiction with the legitimate government&#39;s position on the territorial integrity of Yemen. There is also al-Hizam al-Amni under the command of Salafist leaders, such as Hani Ben Brik who is at the same time vice president of the STC. To this must added the Southern Revolutionary Movement (Hirak a-Thawri al- Janubi), led by Fadi Ba&rsquo;oum (based in Oman). The movement is not involved in the armed conflict directly, but is against the military intervention, and advocates independence of the South while maintaining good relations with the Houtis in San&rsquo;aa.

Moreover, the are three other southern movements, known as Southern movement of Ali Ba Thawab, a socialist trend, TAJ movement or Tajamu al- Demoqrati al-Janubi (The Southern Democratic Assembly) and TAA (Tajamu &#39;Abna&#39; Aden) the last one oppose the military intervention, and is open to dialogue with the Houthis. Furthermore, there is a pacifist movement known as al-Hirak al-Silmi, which is based in Sanaa, chaired by Khaled Abu Bakr Baras. The movement is against the intervention, and is closely affiliated to the Houthis. And finally, the Mu&#39;tamar al-Hadramout (the Hadramout Conference), which has separatist claims and advocates for the independence of Hadramout region, and is mainly supported by UAE.

Regarding the Pan-Arab left parties, it can be mentioned that they are all divided between Baathists and Nasserists. The Baathists have two opposing tendencies, one shaped on the Syrian model, and one influenced by the former Iraqi model. The Nasserites have a trend that opposes the military intervention and a trend which is closely affiliated to president Hadi - occupying several ministerial and advisory positions in his government.

There are also other factors which reinforce these fractured lines: for example between secularist/ Islamist, traditionalist/modernist orientations...etc. It is important here to clarify that the relationship between the regional &quot;geopolitical stakeholders&quot;, and the Yemeni political parties is not always one-sided, i.e., they are based on transactional relationships, and of a give-and-take nature - which means that they are not just puppets in the hands of regional actors. There are currently tensions between the STC and UAE for example. The same holds true for the Houthis, who despite their close ties with Iran, remain attached to their ancestral culture, Zeydism and have a wide and free maneuver for autonomous action.

The longer the war persists, the more - paradoxically - it reinforces local forces and makes them stronger, in term of technical, tactical, financial, and recruitment capabilities. The geopolitical stakeholders&#39; direct support to these armed factions is a strong and detrimental factor of the current fragmentation. Even if it gives the false illusion of having a unifying effect, in the sense of virtually bringing armed factions under an umbrella of a single coalition. If nothing is done, the situation will reach a point of no return, namely that of the end of the Yemeni state as such. Repeating and cementing nightmare dynamics similar to those seen in Iraq and Libya. At this stage, after more than three years of conflict, it will no longer be possible to return to &quot;the unitary model&quot;, the people of South Yemen, will never accept such a retreat, which augurs a new front against Hadi&#39;s government. This being said, the Southern parties are deeply divided, and risk plunging into a fratricidal war similar to all postcolonial conflicts, with conflicts linked to the delineation of borders, tribal dynamics, the distribution of wealth, control of the sea ports and regions, and likely serious international or regional repercutions.

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Yemen: From a fragmentation of the conflict to a dissolution of the State - Part II

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